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Abstract
Intellectual property rights for commercial crops have become in-
creasingly controversial as plant breeders have sought to protect their
investment through licensing and royalties, and farmers, in particular
ecologically-oriented farmers, have promoted seed-saving as a conser-
vation measure. Plant breeders have argued that seed saving reduces
sales to breeders and that the imposition of royalties is necessary to
maintain sales and to compensate them for the intellectual property
invested in commercial varieties. These issues are explored here. In
this paper, an optimal control model of seed purchase decisions in the
presence of seed saving is developed. The model is used to analyze
the impact of both point of sale royalties and end-point royalties on
seed puchase decisions. The two approaches to levying royalties are
then compared and policy conclusions drawn.
J EL Classification: Q18,Q12,D92
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1 Introduction
The issue of plant breeders’ rights versus the farmer’s privilege to save seed
is a controversial one. The farmer’s perspective is neatly summarized by
Woodhouse (1933) [13, pp. 106-107]:
The production of seed has been overlooked to a large extent.
When producing the seed necessary to sow on the farm, it is also
possible to produce an additional amount of seed sufficient to pay
all costs in connection with the harvesting, and the seed used on
the farm costs practically nothing. There are many grasses and
clovers which are adapted to certain sections that will not pro-
duce seed crops under those particular conditions. It is entirely
possible to use only such grasses and clovers as will produce a
seed crop in the vicinity in which they are grown, thus making it
unnecessary to buy from outside sources.
The statement that farm seed “costs practically nothing” and that it
may be “unnecessary to buy from outside sources” is precisely what disturbs
today’s plant breeder’s the most. The time, effort, money and resources de-
voted to plant breeding today are enormous and without doubt farmers have
benefited from this through increased yields and profitability. Plant breeders’
rights are therefore protected by law. However, legislation also protects the
farmer’s privilege to save seeds so neatly summarized by L.H.Woodhouse.
The regulation of breeders’ rights for plant breeding is governed by the
“International Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants” 1991.
The governing body responsible for co-ordinating implementation of the con-
vention is the “international union for the protection of new varieties of
plants” (UPOV). UPOV is an international organization based in Geneva.
Details of plant breeders’ rights are subject to the legislation of individual
countries. However, member countries attempt to craft legislation that is
compliant with the UPOV convention.
In the United States plant breeder rights are regulated by the ”Plant
Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994”. Paragraph 113 of the Act
states:
Except to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement
under subsections (3) and (4) of section 111, it shall not infringe any
right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from
seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the
owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in
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the production of a crop for use on the farm of the person, or for sale
as provided in this section. A bona fide sale for other than repro-
ductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes, of
seed produced on a farm either from seed obtained by authority of the
owner for seeding purposes or from seed produced by descent on such
farm from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding pur-
poses shall not constitute an infringement. A purchaser who diverts
seed from such channels to seeding purposes shall be deemed to have
notice under section 127 that the actions of the purchaser constitute
an infringement. (7 U.S.C. 2543.)
Consequently, seed-saving is protected by law. The situation rearding
how to levy royalties differs however from country to country. So for example
Australian plant breeders’ rights are governed by the “Plant breeders rights
act 1994” (PBR). Section 17 of this act states:
Conditioning and use of farm saved seed does not infringe PBR (1) If:
(a) a person engaged in farming activities legitimately obtains propa-
gating material of a plant variety covered by PBR either by purchase
or by previous operation of this section, for use in such activities; and
(b) the plant variety is not included within a taxon declared under
subsection (2) to be a taxon to which this subsection does not apply;
and (c) the person subsequently harvests further propagating mate-
rial from plants grown from that first-mentioned propagating material;
the PBR is not infringed by: (d) the conditioning of so much of that
further propagating material as is required for the persons use for
reproductive purposes; or (e) the reproduction of that further propa-
gating material. (2) The regulations may declare a particular taxon
to be a taxon to which subsection (1) does not apply.
Current controversy in Australia should be interpreted as pressure by
plant breeders to change section 17 of the act. An equivalent provision is not
contained in the UPOV convention. Therefore this should be interpreted as
a provision in the Australian act that was designed by legislators to protect
farmers engaged in seed saving activity.
Canadian legislation includes “The Plant Breeders’ Rights Act” (PVP
Gazette 62 Published: April) 1991 and the “Regulations Respecting Plant
Breeders’ Rights” (PVP Gazette 69 Published: November) 1992. Canada’s
solution to the seed saving issue differs quite markedly from the Australian
solution. The paragraph of the Canadian “plant breeder’s rights act 1991”,
relating to compulsory licenses states that:
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(1) Subject to this section and the regulations, the Commissioner shall,
on application by any person, where the Commissioner considers that
it is appropriate to do so, confer on the person in the form of a com-
pulsory licence rights to do any thing that the holder might authorize
another person to do pursuant to paragraph 5(1)(d). (2) In disposing
of an application for, and settling the terms of, a compulsory licence
pursuant to this section in relation to any plant variety, the Commis-
sioner shall endeavour to secure that (a) the plant variety is made
available to the public at reasonable prices, is widely distributed and
is maintained in quality; and (b) there is reasonable remuneration,
which may include royalty, for the holder of the plant breeders rights
respecting the plant variety.
Paragraph 5(1) states:
(1) Subject to this Act, the holder of the plant breeders rights respect-
ing a plant variety has the exclusive right (a) to sell, and produce in
Canada for the purpose of selling, propagating material, as such, of the
plant variety; (b) to make repeated use of propagating material of the
plant variety in order to produce commercially another plant variety
if the repetition is necessary for that purpose; (c) where it is a plant
variety to which ornamental plants or parts thereof normally marketed
for purposes other than propagation belong, to use any such plants
or parts commercially as propagating material in the production of
ornamental plants or cut flowers; and (d) to authorize, conditionally
or unconditionally, the doing of an act described in paragraphs (a) to
(c).
The latter has a counterpart in Australian law and is derived directly from
the UPOV convention. However, under Canadian law the seed saving issue is
addressed somewhat less directly. The comissioner of plant breeders’ rights
has the following powers with respect to seed saving according to section 5(3)
and 5(4) of the Canadian act:
Implications
(3) A sale of propagating material in the exercise of any exclusive right
conferred by subsection (1) does not imply that the seller authorizes
the purchaser to produce, for the purpose of selling, propagating ma-
terial as such but, subject to any terms or conditions imposed by the
seller, the sale implies that the seller authorizes the purchaser to sell
anything sold, in that exercise of the exclusive right, to the purchaser.
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Royalty
(4) Without limiting the generality of paragraph (1)(d) and without
prejudice to any rights or privileges of the Crown, where authority is
conferred subject to conditions pursuant to that paragraph, whether
or not the holder of the plant breeders rights is Her Majesty in right
of Canada or a province, the conditions may include a requirement to
pay royalty to the holder.
Consequently, Canadian legislation according to 5(3) allows farmers to
save seed and 5(4) allows the levying of royalties but does not define how the
royalty is to be levied.
So while Australian law explicitly protects seed saving, in Canada the
protection of seed saving is implied. The question as to whether a POS or
end-point regime should be used is open as far as the legislation in both
countries goes.
Consequently, in all three countries seed saving is protected by law. How-
ever, the details of the royalty scheme are not legislated. Only in Australia
has an end-point royalty scheme been adopted. The details are however con-
tractual, so for example, seeds purchased from the Australian Wheat Board
(AWB Ltd.) incur an end-point royalty that may be paid in one of two ways
(http://www.awb.com.au/growers/awbseeds/ endpointroyalties/paymentofendpointroyalties/):
A grower who purchases a AWB Seeds variety has an enduring contrac-
tual obligation to pay an End Point Royalty on all production, except
grower saved seed, and this can be done in either of two ways; Option
1 Deliver directly to one of the authorised Collection Marketers (listed
below) - the End Point Royalty (GST inclusive) is automatically de-
ducted by the Collection Marketer upon payment for the grain, and a
Tax Invoice prepared and sent to the grower. Option 2 Growers can
choose to market their commodity grain to any third party (ie non
Collection Marketer), subject to payment of the End Point Royalty
to AWB Seeds. In this case, the grower must make the End Point
Royalty payment (GST inclusive) directly to AWB Seeds within 30
days after day of sale. AWB Seeds will return a Tax Invoice to the
grower.
This scheme corresponds to our case II below in which an end-point roy-
alty is levied on sold grain. In the UK however, royalties are also collected on
farm-saved seed, which necessitates harvest monitoring. UK practice is for
farmers to self-report saved seed to the the British Society of Plant Breeders
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(BSPB). The model presented here does not distinguish between who moni-
tors but simply assumes that there may be innacuracies in the reporting or
monitoring of total harvest. A further difference is that in the UK a lower
royalty is applied to farm-saved seed than to sold grain. Consequently, case
III presented here corresponds roughly to the UK situation, but differs in
some of the details.
Despite, progress in a number of countries in introducing royalty pay-
ments on seed, there has nevertheless, been considerable lobbying for changes
to the current system of royalties in all countries. In Canada for example the
2004 Seed Sector Review, stated:
There was no clear picture as to what could be done to effectively
collect royalties on farm saved seed, if in the future this is the direction
that the industry chooses to go. Suggestions were made that royalties
could be collected through elevators or seed processors or through
CWB contract programs. In order to collect royalties, the variety
would need to be identified (common seed carry the variety name) or
else royalties from farm saved seed could be allocated on the basis
of market shares in pedigreed seed sales. Allowing variety names on
common seed would have implications to the seed certification system
and identity preserved programs.
This has been interpreted by some as a recommendation to introduce
a royalty scheme to recover the costs of research and development of seed
varieties in order to finance investment into plant breeding research. In
terms of maintaining the balance between “farmer’s privilege” and “breeders’
rights”, proper design of a royalty scheme is crucial. Previous studies have
not directly, addressed this issue.
Much of the literature has been in the nature of review articles or broad
policy appraisals. Lesser (1997) [12] provides an overview of issues around
intellectual property and plant breeding. Kingwell and Watson [7] discuss in
broad policy terms the possible impact of end-point royalties on Australian
agriculture, Lindner (2004) [8] discusses the trend towards privatisation of
plant breeding in Australia and around the world, but does so again in terms
of broad policy. Kingwell (2005) [9] surveys institutional changes and changes
in property rights in australian plant breeding, Kingwell (2001) [10] provides
the first detailed analysis of plant breeding royalties in the forms of a static
model of farm decision making under risk.
Kingwell considers four possible royalty scenario’s: i) a flat charge, ii) a
flat charge per tonne, iii) an ad valorem royalty on production and iv) a profit
based royalty. The focus of Kingwell’s contribution is on the moral hazard
7
aspects of the problem. In this paper the intertemporal incentive effects of
various royalty scenarios are explored with a focus on how seed-saving and
royalties interact to have an impact on the demand for seed.
Seed-saving is inherently an activity that links farmer decision making
over time. If sufficient seed is saved, future demand for new seed will be
reduced and vice versa. The intertemporal impact of plant breeding royalties
on farm seed purchase decisions can not therefore be ignored. These issues
are studied in this paper using an optimal control model of seed saving. This
is used to analyse the incentive effects of different royalty schemes. A point
of sale royalty scheme is compared to two types of end-point royalty scheme
one based on grain sales and one based on monitoring of harvested grain.
The three schemes are then compared.
Section 2 presents the basic model of farm profit with seed storage costs
incorporated. Section 3 derives the steady-state demand for new seed using
a discrete-time optimal control model of seed-saving in the context of a point
of sale royalty scheme. Section 4 proceeds similarly but examines the impact
of an end-point royalty scheme based on the amount of grain sold. Section
5 examines an end-point royalty scheme in which monitoring of the harvest
is used as the basis for levying the royalty. Section 6 compares the incentive
effects of the different schemes and section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
An optimal control model of the intertemporal impact of levying plant breed-
ing royalties on farms is presented. The model is presented in three parts.
Firstly, the impact of point of sale levying of royalties is analysed before
moving on to the impact of end-point royalties. There are two ways of im-
plementing end-point royalties, either on sold grain or on harvested grain. A
comparison of the three approaches is then made in terms of intertemporal
incentives.
Consider first the case of a point of sale levy. Farm profit in each period
is given by
Πt = p(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− (c1 + r)bt − c2θf(xt + bt)
or revenue from the sale of grain minus the cost of purchasing seed plus
the royalty r minus the cost of storing seed from one period to the next
c2θf(xt + bt).
The variables and constants used are as follows:
• p is the sale price of grain
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• θ the proportion of grain retained for seed into the next period.
• xt the amount of seed available from carryover.
• bt the amount of seed purchased each period.
• f(xt + bt) the production function for grain.
• c1 the price of seed.
• r royalties.
• θ proportion of seed saved.
• c2 the cost of storing grain from one period to the next, one can think of
this as the amortization rate of a silo, alternatively, storage costs may
be determined using the cost function from inventory control theory,
such as holding costs in the EOQ-model.
Further to the point about the costs of grain storage, it is assumed in what
follows that θ has been determined by solving an intertemporal EOQ inven-
tory model so that the proportion of seed saved is determined by minimizing
total costs to determine the optimal seed inventory policy.
Two cases are distinguished for levying royalties: i) levying at point of
sale and ii) levying at the end-point, known as an end-point royalty (EPR).
Point of sale royalties are considered first.
An additional assumption that will be made is that open-pollination seeds
which are considered here, are perfect substitutes for hybrid varieties and vice
versa in any given period. Hybrid varieties may be propagated but the resul-
tant seed has undesirable characteristics and is generally not commerically
valuable. These cannot therefore be saved and play no role in the dynamical
analysis developed in this paper as long as open-pollination and hybrid seed
varieties are assumed to be perfect substitutes and that the crop production
technology is additively separable in open-pollination and hybrid seed, then
the role of hybrid seed may be ignored. The key point is that while these
two seed varieties are clearly not intertemporally perfect substitutes from an
intratemporal perspective this assumption is not overly restrictive. While
one could drop this assumption this complicates the analysis and does not
contribute to the key question addressed in this paper, which is which royalty
structure is preferable in terms of protecting breeders rights.
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3 Point of sale royalties
Farmers maximize the discounted profit stream by choosing the amount of
seed to purchase bt in each period t.
max
bt
∞∑
t=0
ρt {p(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− (c1 + r)bt − c2θf(xt + bt)}
It is assumed that seed is carried over from each harvest in a fixed pro-
portion
xt+1 = θf(xt + bt)
This assumption appears somewhat restrictive, but is necessary for ana-
lytical tractability. In essence, it is assumed that our time horizon is short
enough that seed storage capacity does not change through investment in
additional capacity, but long enough that saved seed reaches a steady-state.
In terms of analysing the impact of royalties on seed purchasing decisions
assuming a fixed rate of carryover of seed does not however, appear to be
important. So although it may be desirable to relax this assumption it is not
absolutely critical.
A current value Hamiltonian for the above problem is given by
H˜ = p(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− (c1 + r)bt − c2θf(xt + bt) + ρλt+1 [θf(xt + bt)− xt]
Pontryagin’s maximum principle gives the following
∂H˜
∂bt
= p(1−θ)f ′(xt+bt)−(c1+r)−c2θf ′(xt+bt)+ρλt+1θf ′(xt+bt) = 0 (1)
ρλt+1−λt = −∂H˜
∂xt
= −
[
p(1− θ)f ′(xt + bt)− c2θf ′(xt + bt) + ρλt+1
[
θf
′
(xt + bt)− 1
]]
(2)
From (1) and (2) one obtains
ρλt+1θf
′
(xt + bt)− λt = c2θf ′(xt + bt)− p(1− θ)f ′(xt + bt) (3)
In steady-state one-obtains from (3) (with time subscripts now suppressed):[
ρθf
′
(x+ b)− 1
]
λ = c2θf
′
(x+ b)− p(1− θ)f ′(x+ b) (4)
On rearranging (4) notice that:
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λ =
c2θf
′
(x+ b)− p(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)
ρθf ′(x+ b)− 1 (5)
then substitute (5) into the first-order condition (1) to obtain:
p(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)− (c1 + r)− c2θf ′(x+ b) +
ρ
[
c2θf
′
(x+ b)− p(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)
ρθf ′(x+ b)− 1
]
θf
′
(x+ b) = 0 (6)
or
p(θ−1)f ′(x+b)+(c1+r)+c2θf ′(x+b) = ρ
[
c2θf
′
(x+ b)− p(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)
ρθf ′(x+ b)− 1
]
θf
′
(x+b)
The left hand side of this is just the expression for the marginal opportu-
nity cost of saving seed pθf
′
(x+ b) plus the marginal cost of purchasing seed
and the right-hand side is the expression for the discounted marginal benefit
of saving seed.
A simple expression for the level of royalty for which the farmer is indif-
ferent between saving and purchasing seed may now be obtained:
r = ρ
[
c2θf
′
(x+ b)− p(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)
ρθf ′(x+ b)− 1
]
θf
′
(x+b)−pθf ′(x+b)−(c1)−c2θf ′(x+b)
That is the royalty on each tonne of seed purchased should be set equal
to the difference between marginal benefits of saving seeds and the marginal
costs of saving purchasing and storing seeds.
The seed industry has been concerned that they lose revenue from seed
saving by farmers. In order to recover revenue royalties may be imposed.
What impact does imposition of a point of sale royalty have on seed pur-
chases? to address this question the crop production technology needs to be
specified in more detail. In what follows a logarithmic production function
f(x+ b) = log(x+ b) is considered.
Substituting this functional form into the steady-state first order condi-
tions (6) results in the following:
p(1− θ) 1
x+ b
− (c1 + r)− c2θ 1
x+ b
+ ρ
[
c2θ
1
x+b
− p(1− θ) 1
x+b
ρθ 1
x+b
− 1
]
θ
1
x+ b
= 0
Multiplying by x+ b and simplifying gives:
p(1− θ)− (c1 + r)(x+ b)− c2θ + ρ
[
c2θ − p(1− θ)
ρθ − (x+ b)
]
θ = 0
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or
−(c1 + r)(x+ b)2 − (x+ b) [p(1− θ) + c2θ + (c1 + r)ρθ] + ρc2θ2 = 0
This is easily solved for (x+ b) and then for b:
b =
− [(c1 + r)ρθ + p(1− θ) + c2θ]±
√
[p(1− θ) + c2θ + (c1 + r)ρθ]2 + 4(c1 + r)ρc2θ2
2(−(c1 + r)) −x
Differentiating this with respect to r gives the impact of a a point of sale
royalty on farm seed purchasing decisions. The simplest way to do this is to
define a new function
g(b, r) := −(c1 + r)(x+ b)2− (x+ b) [p(1− θ) + c2θ + (c1 + r)ρθ] + ρc2θ2 = 0
and then implictly differentiate this to obtain db
dr
:
db
dr
= − (x+ b)
2 + (x+ b)ρθ
2(c1 + r)(x+ b) + [p(1− θ) + c2θ + (c1 + r)ρθ]
which is clearly less than zero.
Consequently the steady-state impact of introducing point of sale royalties
for seed will be negatively sloped as expected, but counter to the claims of
plant breeders that royalties will protect them from losing revenue. Another
way of thinking of this is that a point of sale royalty simply shifts the price
of seed faced by the farmer thereby shifting the demand for seed.
This last point is illustrated by comparing the ex-ante slope of the demand
function for seed db
dc1
to the ex-post slope of the demand function for seed
db
d(c1+r)
.
The former is also obtained by implictly differentiating g(b, c1) to obtain:
db
dc1
= − (x+ b)
2 + (x+ b)ρθ
2(c1 + r)(x+ b) + [p(1− θ) + c2θ + (c1 + r)ρθ]
The latter is obtained similarly:
db
d(c1 + r)
= − (x+ b)
2 + (x+ b)ρθ
2(c1 + r)(x+ b) + [p(1− θ) + c2θ + (c1 + r)ρθ]
This clearly indicates that the slope of the steady-state demand curve
does not change due to imposition of the POS levy. Combining this with
the result db
dr
< 0 it an be concluded that the steady-state demand curve
shifts to the left as the result of imposition of a POS levy. This implies
ceteris paribus that producer surplus must decline. Consequently, a POS
levy will not benefit plant breeders. It remains to consider an end-point
royalty system.
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4 End-point royalties
End-point royalties have been implemented most widely in Australia. End-
point royalties involve imposing a levy on the harvested amount of grain. If
this is done for grain sales farm profit is as follows:
Πt = (p− r)(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− c1bt − c2θf(xt + bt)
If the levy is based on the amount of grain harvested and this is monitored
perfectly then farm profit is given by:
Πt = p(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− rf(xt + bt)− c1bt − c2θf(xt + bt)
If the harvest cannot be monitored perfectly then farm profit is given by:
Πt = p(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− rξf(xt + bt)− c1bt − c2θf(xt + bt)
where ξ is a uniformly distributed random variable with unit interval
support, that measures the proportion of actual harvest observed by the
plant breeder. This gives us three cases to evaluate, however the last two
cases may be treated as one and then setting ξ = 1 to evaluate the perfect
monitoring case.
4.1 Case I: Levying royalties on sold grain
Firstly, consider the case of levying royalties on the actual amount of grain
sold. The farmers objective function is then given by:
max
bt
∞∑
t=0
ρt {(p− r)(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− c1bt − c2θf(xt + bt)}
It is assumed that seed is carried over from each harvest in a fixed pro-
portion
xt+1 = θf(xt + bt)
current value Hamiltonian for the above problem is given by
H˜ = (p− r)(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− c1bt − c2θf(xt + bt) + ρλt+1 [θf(xt + bt)− xt]
Pontryagin’s maximum principle gives the following
∂H˜
∂bt
= (p− r)(1− θ)f ′(xt + bt)− c1 − c2θf ′(xt + bt)+
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ρλt+1θf
′
(xt + bt) = 0 (7)
ρλt+1 − λt = −∂H˜
∂xt
=
−
[
(p− r)(1− θ)f ′(xt + bt)− c2θf ′(xt + bt) + ρλt+1
[
θf
′
(xt + bt)− 1
]]
(8)
From (7) and (8) one obtains:
ρλt+1θf
′
(xt + bt)− λt = c2θf ′(xt + bt)− (p− r)(1− θ)f ′(xt + bt) (9)
In steady-state one-obtains from (9) (with time subscripts now suppressed):
λ
[
ρθf
′
(x+ b)− 1
]
= c2θf
′
(x+ b)− (p− r)(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)
On rearranging notice that:
λ =
c2θf
′
(x+ b)− (p− r)(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)
ρθf ′(x+ b)− 1 (10)
then substitute (10) into the first-order conditions to obtain:
(p− r)(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)− c1 − c2θf ′(x+ b)+
ρ
[
c2θf
′
(x+ b)− (p− r)(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)
ρθf ′(x+ b)− 1
]
θf
′
(x+ b) = 0
or
(p− r)(θ − 1)f ′(x+ b) + c1 + c2θf ′(x+ b) =
ρ
[
c2θf
′
(x+ b)− (p− r)(1− θ)f ′(x+ b)
ρθf ′(x+ b)− 1
]
θf
′
(x+ b)
The left hand side is just the expression for the marginal opportunity cost
of saving seed net of royalties (p−r)(θ−1)f ′(x+ b) plus the marginal cost of
purchasing seed and the right-hand side is the expression for the discounted
marginal benefit of saving seed.
In what follows a logarithmic production function f(x + b) = log(x + b)
is considered.
Substituting this functional form into the steady-state first order condi-
tions results in the following:
(p− r)(θ− 1) 1
x+ b
+ c1 + c2θ
1
x+ b
= ρ
[
c2θ
1
x+b
− (p− r)(1− θ) 1
x+b
ρθ 1
x+b
− 1
]
θ
1
x+ b
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⇒ (p− r)(θ − 1) + c1 + c2θ = ρ
[
c2θ − (p− r)(1− θ)
ρθ − (x+ b)
]
θ
Solving for b one obtains:
b = ρθ − ρ
[
c2θ − (p− r)(1− θ)
(p− r)(θ − 1) + c1 + c2θ
]
θ − x
Differentiating this with repsect to r gives the impact of an end-point
royalty on farmer seed purchasing decisions:
db
dr
=
−ρ(1− θ)θ((p− r)(θ − 1) + c1 + c2θ) + (θ − 1)(c2θ − (p− r)(1− θ))ρθ
((p− r)(θ − 1) + c1 + c2θ)2
The denominator of this is quadratic and therefore positive, the numera-
tor may be simplified to:
−ρ(1− θ)θ(c1 + c2θ − (p− r)(1− θ))− (1− θ)(c2θ − (p− r)(1− θ))ρθ
which again noting that ρ and θ lie between zero and one is clearly neg-
ative, so that db
dr
< 0.
It remains to evaluate what impact harvest monitoring would have.
4.2 Case II: Harvest Monitoring
max
bt
∞∑
t=0
ρt {p(1− θ)f(xt + bt)− rξf(xt + bt)− c1bt − c2θf(xt + bt)}
It is assumed that seed is carried over from each harvest in a fixed pro-
portion
xt+1 = θf(xt + bt)
The current value Hamiltonian for the above problem is given by
H˜ = p(1−θ)f(xt+bt)−rξf(xt+bt)−c1bt−c2θf(xt+bt)+ρλt+1 [θf(xt + bt)− xt]
Pontryagin’s maximum principle gives the following
∂H˜
∂bt
= p(1−θ)f ′(x+ b)− rξf ′(x+ b)− c1− c2θf ′(x+ b)+ρλt+1θf ′(x+ b) = 0
(11)
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ρλt+1 − λt = −∂H˜
∂xt
=
−
[
(p− rξ)f ′(x+ b)− θ(p+ c2)f ′(x+ b) + ρλt+1
(
θf
′
(x+ b)− 1
)]
(12)
analysing the co-state equation (12) in steady-state and suppressing time
subscripts one obtains on solving for λ:
λ =
−
[
(p− rξ)f ′(x+ b)− θ(p+ c2)f ′(x+ b)
]
ρθf ′(x+ b)− 1 (13)
substituting (13) into the first-order conditions and rearranging, one ob-
tains the following quadratic polynomial in f
′
(x+ b):
Af
′
(x+ b)2 +Bf
′
(x+ b) + c1 = 0 (14)
where
• A = [p(1− θ)− rξ − c2θ + ρθ2(p+ c2)]
• B = − [c1ρθ + p(1− θ)− rξ − c2θ + ρθ(p− rξ)]
Solving (14) gives two solution:
f
′
(x+ b) =
−B ±√B2 − 4Ac1
2A
Assuming that f(x+b) = log(x+b), then differentiating and substituting
into the quadratic equation and solving for b results in:
b =
2A
−B ±√B2 − 4Ac1
− x
Once again this is the steady-state demand curve for seed. Differentiating
this with respect to the royalty r allows us to determine impact of the royalty
on the demand for seed:
db
dr
=
−2ξ
[
−B ±√B2 − 4Ac1
]
− 2A
[
−(1 + ρθ)ξ ± 1
2
[B2 − 4Ac1]−
1
2 (−2(1 + ρθ)ξ + 4ξc1)
]
[
−B ±√B2 − 4Ac1
]2
Because by assumption the production function is positively sloped
−B±
√
B2−4Ac1
2A
>
0 and because the denominator is squared and therefore positive, the sign of
the numerator can be determined by noting that
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db
dr
> 0, if f
′
(x+b) > −
[
−(1 + ρθ)ξ ± 1
2
[B2 − 4Ac1]−
1
2 (−2(1 + ρθ)ξ + 4ξc1)
]
2ξ
If one assumes that
[
−(1 + ρθ)ξ ± 1
2
[B2 − 4Ac1]−
1
2 (−2(1 + ρθ)ξ + 4ξc1)
]
<
0, then this can be interpreted to mean that if the marginal product of seed
is sufficiently high then a royalty with monitoring will have a positive impact
on seed demand. If however the marginal product is not sufficiently high then
introducing a royalty would have a negative impact on seed demand. The
assumed inequality leads to a polynomial inequality in monitoring accuracy
ξ, the solution of which gives a range of values of ξ between which the lower
bound on the marginal product of seed remains valid (see appendix). If ξ
were to fall outside this range but still lie within the unit interval then the
marginal product of seed would be bounded below by a negative number,
db
dr
> 0 would then be true regardless. If however ξ lies within the range
then it is possible that for sufficiently samll marginal products of seed, that
db
dr
< 0.
How the different seed regimes compare will be discussed in the following
section.
5 Comparative analysis and policy implica-
tions
How does the impact compare between POS and an end-point royalty scheme?
Denoting the impact of introducing an end-point royalty scheme on puschases
of seed by db
EP
dr
and the impact of introducing a POS royalty scheme on seed
purchases by db
POS
dr
taking the difference and evaluating each derivative at
r = 0 one obtains:
dbEP
dr
|r=0−db
POS
dr
|r=0 = −ρ(1− θ)θ(p(θ − 1) + c1 + c2θ) + (θ − 1)(c2θ − p(1− θ))ρθ
(p(θ − 1) + c1 + c2θ)2
+
(x+ b)2 + (x+ b)ρθ
2(c1)(x+ b) + [p(1− θ) + c2θ + (c1)ρθ]
The shift to end-point royalty regime would not be justified if this differ-
ence were negative (see below), ie. if the reduction in demand under an EP
system were grater than under a POS system, assuming this is so and based
on the (negative) signs already obtained for the impacts under each regime
one obtains:
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dbEP
dr
|r=0 − db
POS
dr
|r=0 < 0
However beacause both derivatives are negatively signed, one obtains1:∣∣∣∣∣dbEPdr |r=0
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣dbPOSdr |r=0
∣∣∣∣∣
Consequently, if royalties are levied on sold grain and if this condition is
fulfilled, an end-point royalty scheme will reduce demand for seed more than
a point of sale royalty scheme. Note however that
∣∣∣dbEP
dr
∣∣∣
r=0
is independent
of the amount of sown seed x+ b, so that in terms of scale∣∣∣∣∣dbEPdr |r=0
∣∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∣dbPOSdr |r=0
∣∣∣∣∣
if the price of seed and cost of storage of grain are sufficiently small.
So under these circumstances an end-point royalty scheme would be more
preferable. If however seed prices are high and costs of storage are high
then introducing end-point royalties rather than POS royalties may be more
detrimental.
Usually, however a POS royalty scheme is already in place so that one is
comparing db
EP
dr
|r=0 to dbPOSdr . both of these derivatives are negative however,
first of these is independt of x and b the latter however is quadratic in x+ b
implying due to the raltive size of x+b that the size of the impact on demand
under point of sale is much larger. What does this mean? It means that in
switching from a POS system to an EP system where royalties are reduced
from some positive level to zero under the POS system and then increased
from zero to some positive level under the EP system, that demand for new
seed will go up under POS more than it goes down under EP. Granted these
changes are for all intents and purposes instantaneous, nevertheless, one can
expect an increase in seed demand from moving from POS to EP, which is
precisely why plant breeders are arguing for this.
How does the impact of a royalty under monitoring compare with each
of these two cases? Recall that with monitoring db
MON
dr
can take on either
sign depending on the marginal product of seed. Furthermore, recall that
the validity of the inequality depends on a range of values monitoring values
1To see this note the seond term becomes positive because two negatives are multiplied,
taking this to the other side gives two negative signs on both sides of the inequality,
expressing things in terms of absolute values then reverses the sign of the inequality. Note
that this is equivalent to expressing the impact in terms of elasticities if r = 0
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ξ. If this range lies within the unit interval then there will exist some values
of ξ for which the marginal product of seed is bounded by negative values.
Because ξ must lie within the unit interval by definition, this possibility will
be excluded in other cases. Effectively, this means there may be some values
of ξ for which the impact of introducing a royalty is always positive. The
solution of the polynomial inequality also depends on the level of royalty to
be introduced. This has interesting policy consequences.
Because the marginal product of seed is in part determined by research
and development undertaken by plant breeders and these same plant breeders
through political lobbying can influence the level of royalty to be imposed.
This along with the possible positive impact of a royalty on seed demand,
gives them an incentive to lobby for certain royalties.
In comparing a royalty scheme with monitoring to a POS royalty scheme
or an EP royalty scheme levied on sold grain, the main difference is that
there are circumstances under which an EP scheme with monitoring could
lead to an increase in demand rather than a fall. From the plant breeder’s
perspective this then is clearly the prefereed scheme.
6 Conclusion
In this paper an optimal control model of farm seed-saving under three dif-
ferent royalty schemes was presented: i) a POS royalty, ii) end-point royalty
on sold grain, and iii) an End-Point royalty with harvest monitoring. steady-
state demand curves for seed were derived under each regime and the impact
of introducing a royalty in each case was evaluated. In the first two cases
it was found that contrary to plant breeder expectations, the impact of in-
troducing seed royalties was likely to be negative, i.e. a royalty scheme was
likely to reduce demand for registered seed. In the case of an end-point roy-
alty scheme with harvest monitoring, a royalty scheme could have a positive
impact on farm seed, if the the marginal product of seed is sufficiently high
and if both the level of royalty and and the accuracy of monitoring remains
within a specific range. These factors, may be influenced by plant breeder
groups through lobbying. Consequently, plant breeder groups have an incen-
tive to lobby for an end-point royalty scheme with harvest monitoring.
A possible extension of the model is to design a royalty scheme. To do
this the model would have to incoproate plant breeder behavior. This could
be done by developing an intertemporal principle agent model incorporating
investment in research and development of seed varieties with farmers as
agents. Such an extension is beyond the scope of this paper.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Mathematically the condition that
[
−(1 + ρθ)ξ ± 1
2
[B2 − 4Ac1]−
1
2 (−2(1 + ρθ)ξ + 4ξc1)
]
<
0 is interesting in that it leads to a polynomial inequality in monitoring ac-
curacy ξ. The derivation is given here:
1
2
[
B2 − 4Ac1
]− 1
2 (−2(1 + ρθ)ξ + 4ξc1) < (1 + ρθ)ξ
[
B2 − 4Ac1
]− 1
2 < 2
(1 + ρθ)
4c1 − 2(1 + ρθ)
B2 − 4Ac1 < 2
(
4c1 − 2(1 + ρθ)
2(1 + ρθ)
)2
Expanding the quadratic term on the left hand side results in
(r + ρθr)2ξ2 − 2(r + ρθr)(−c1ρθ + p(1− θ)− c2θ + ρθp) + 4rc1)ξ+
(−c1ρθ+p(1−θ)−c2θ+ρθp)2−4
[
p(1− θ)− c2θ + ρθ2(p+ c2)
]
c1−2
(
4c1 − 2(1 + ρθ)
2(1 + ρθ)
)2
< 0
The solution of this gives a range of values of ξ between which the lower
bound on the marginal product of seed remains valid.
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